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THE PROBLEM or DEscENT AN DIsTmTrIoN: A NEEi FOR
LEGISLATION
Introduction
Adoption in the United States is fast becoming an everyday
remedy for childless couples desiring the companionship and joy
of children in their homes. In 1948 it was estimated that petitions
for adoption ran well over 50,000,' which fact is driving, and will
drive, many complex problems to the offices of attorneys every-
where. The American Law Institute recognized the importance of
this field in 1952, when it issued a monograph on Family Law in
its series on continuing legal education.m 2 An important question
which is largely unanswered in this field concerns intestate suc-
cession. As the American Law Institute recognizes, it "is a fruit-
ful source of litigation."3
A Concrete ExamrpZe
A typical situation in this field which will serve to illustrate the
conclusion of the American Law Institute has recently been pre-
sented to the courts of Illinois. At the age of ten, in 1918, Victor
Mueller was taken to Chicago from the State of Wisconsin and was
immediately adopted by his aunt and uncle. Within two weeks he
was home again with his natural parents in Wisconsin who, in
1920, readopted him. Victor never again visited or corresponded
with his aunt or uncle. In 1936 the uncle died, and in 1952, the aunt
passed away. In the probate court, the blood relatives of the child-
less aunt were adjudged to be her heirs; but on appeal the circuit
court held that the re-adoption of Mueller did not alter his right
to inherit from his first adoptive parents, and it reversed the pro-
bate court and held Victor to be the sole heir of the aunt.
The appellate court reinstated the probate court's ruling,4 and
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Illinois, as a case of
first impression, on the issue of whether a child may inherit from
successive sets of adoptive parents. In its decision, one justice dis-
1 LxEvY, THE LAW OF AmOPTION 3x ALL 48 STATES (1948).
2 WnTT= & GIBsoN, FAmLY LAw (1952).
3 Id. at 53.
4 In re Leichtenlerg's Estate, 5 IlM. App. 2d 336, 125 N.E.2d 277 (1955).
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senting, the court affirmed the appiellate court and held Victor
could not inherit as sole heir.5
The Illinois statutes applicable to adoption and intestate succes-
sion do not provide a "yes or no" answer,6 so the court was left to
decide the question with sparse legislative aid. This turned the
problem into one of statutory interpretation and common sense.
The-:court "reviewed- decisions from-, Keiitucky; -Kansas, Iowa,
Washington, Arkansas and New York which held the child may
inherit from the first adoptive parents. But the Illinois court felt
that these cases were a "snow-balling" resulting from a wrong in-
terpretation and extension of two rather early Indiana7 and Ken-
tucky" cases which allowed inheritance where the adoptive parents
'died prior to the second adoption. The minority view of Michigan
and Oklahoma9 disallowing inheritance presented a more prac-
-tical view which the Illinois Supreme Court chose to follow. This
latter view recognizes the fallacy in the reasoning of the majority
of states that since adoption gives the child the rights of a natural
child he is to be treated the same as a natural child. The majority
fails to realize that inheritance is allowed from. a child's natural
parents because, regardless of the status of the child, the child is
of their blood. On the other hand, the Illinois court argued that
an adopted child cannot be the adopted child of successive parents
at the same time, for when there is a new adoption the prior adop-
tion with its rights and obligations is terminated. As a second
ground, the right to inherit was disallowed on the basis of a strict
interpretation of the Illinois statute on adoption.1 0 The court felt
that the legislature intended inheritance only in cases it specified
on the theory that ".... the enumeration of certain things in a statute
implies the exclusion of all others.""- A further practical reason
was advanced due to the difficulty that could arise in a converse
situation, where the child dies intestate with several sets of adop-
tive parents surviving. The court felt that a contrary result, in the
* In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 131 N.E.2d 487 (IlM. 1956).
6 ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955), merely pro-
vides that the child may inherit from his adoptive parents and their lineal
and collateral kindred; and that the adoptive parent can inherit from the
child to the exclusion of the child's natural parents, just as if the adoptee
were a natural child. Further, the statute states the natural parents and
natural collateral relatives of the child can inherit what the child received
through them.
7 Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993 (1896).
* Russell's Adm'r v. Russell's Guardian, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 236 (1892).
9 In re Carpenter's Estate, 327 Mich. 195, 41 N.W.2d 349 (1950); In re
Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N.W. 381 (1917); In re Talley's Estate,
188 Okla. 338, 109 P.2d 495 (1941).
10 See note 6 supra.
-11 In re Leichtenberg's Estate, supra note 5, at 490.
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case before it, would allow these several"sets to acquire the child's
-estate, and hence' there would result confusion in the" heirship.
The dissenting justice, on the other hand, took the plausible view
that the adoption statute is remedial in form and that a liberal con-
struction should follow, since historically, Illinois legislative pol-
• icy has been to give the child broad inheritance rights. Only by
express limitation could the child be deprived of these rights. He
felt that the child will not be given the equality of a natural child
if he does not get the right to inherit from prior adoptive parents.
The theory was advanced that adoption is precisely similar to the
natural relation of parent and child, and a "natural" child never
loses his right to inherit from his "natural" parents. Any other re-
sult, the justice said, is discrimination in contravention of what'he
called a consistent legislative policy to give equality. 2
The Dilemma of the Courts
Clearly this case shows the dilemma into which the courts have
been placed. They are asked by lawyers to settle a dispute which
the statute does not cover. What can they do? Accept a strict in-
terpretation of the statute because of the possibilities of difficulty
'that a contrary result might bring about in tracing heirship? Or
are they compelled to accept a liberal rule as the dissent above
pleads for, on the well known axiom that a remedial statute must
be liberally interpreted? Why are courts placed in this position
and where does the fault lie?
The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate how a case like
the Leichtenberg case can be avoided by twelve or fifteen lines
in the statutes of any state; fifteen lines that will prevent years
of litigation and serious depletion of estates. This is the remedy,
but the foundation of the problem is in the historical develop-
ment of adoption in a common law system.
The Status of the Law- Historical Development
Adoption is a purely statutory creature, being unknown at
common law i s and although it was present under the ancient
civilizations, it has been borrowed by the common law from
Roman law.' 4 The first American statute was passed by Mas-
sachusetts in 1851;35 England did not recognize adoption until
1926.3° The importance of these statutes lies in the fact that
32 Id. at 491.
'3 In re Jaren's Adoption, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656, 660 (1947); In re
Holibaugh's Will, 33 N.J. Super. 232, 109 A.2d 706, 708 (County Ct. 1954).
3.4 PEcx, DommsTic RELATioNs § 123 (3d ed. 1930); Kuhlmann, Intestate
Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28 WAsi. U. L. Q. 221, 222
(1943).
15 MASS. STAT. OF 1851, c. 324.
16 The Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29; see com-
"piler's comment, 9 THE COMP= STAT. OF ENGLAD 827 (1929).
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their purpose was to provide for the betterment of the child
and society and not for heirship,'7 which can still be seen to-
day.' 8 As in any field of law, unless it is comprehensively cov-
ered difficulties will result.
The Status of the Law - Case Law
Over the years, nine examples of the shortcomings of the
adoption statutes have appeared in regard to intestate succes-
sion in the state cases to give impetus to this need for legislation.
They involve: (1) whether or not a child can inherit from his
natural parents after he has been adopted;19 (2) whether or
not he can inherit from his natural relatives;20 (3) whether or
not he can succeed to the estate of his adoptive parents; 2 ' (4)
or succeed to the estate of the lineal or collateral kindred of his
adoptive parents;2 (5) whether or not the child can inherit the
"7 Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 50 So.2d 364, 366 (1951); In re
Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378, 379 (1914); Kuhmann, supra
note 14, at 223-4. The English act made no mention of intestate succession
from the adopter, (1926) 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 5(2), nor did the Mas-
sachusetts act go beyond making the child a natural child for inheritance
purposes, except he could not inherit property limited to heirs of the
adopter's body or from the latter's collateral or lineal relatives. MAss. STAT.
or 1851, c. 324, § 6. The real purpose of these statutes was to give the
children better chances for upbringing. MAss. STAT. or 1851, c. 324, § 5.
-8 See: N.D. REV. CODE § 14-1111 (Supp. 1953), ". . . the child shall be
deemed and taken to be the child of the petitioner or petitioners . . ." and
§ 14-1116 which provides ". . . the relation of parent and child shall be
deemed to have come into existence as of the date [of the decree] . . "
which is the complete adoption law! S.D. CODE § 14.0407 (Supp. 1952), and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-10 and 11 (1953), are to the effect that the legal
relation of parent and child and the rights of that relationship exist between
the adopters and the child; and no rights are left in the natural parents.
19 In re Kay's Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391 (1953) (allowed); Wailes
v. Curators of Central College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645 (1953) (denied).
20 In re Penfield's Estate, 81 F. Supp. 622 (D.D.C. 1949) (allowed); In re
Ries' Estate, 259 Wis. 453, 49 N.W.2d 483 (1951) (denied).
21 It is stated in CalhoUn v. Bryant, 28 S.D. 266, 133 N.W. 266, 271
(1911), that inheritance does not arise out of the parent and child re-
lationship, whether a natural or adopted child, for inheritance is a creature
of the statute. Accord: In re Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322, 20 N.Y.S.2d
862 (Surr. Ct. 1940); In re Howlett's Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 77 A.2d 390 (1951).
Also, In re Uihlein's Estate, 269 Wis. 170, 69 N.W.2d 816 (1955), where an
adopted child was not "issue" within the statute giving it the "legal status
of a natural child" for inheritance from its adopted mother. Compare with
Scott v. Scott, 247 Fed. 976 (D. Idaho 1917), where even though the statute
specified "issue," a remedial act making the child a natural child did give
the child the rights of an "heir of the body" without any exceptions.
22 In re Eddins' Estate, 66 S.D. 109, 279 N.W. 244 (1938) (denied from
grandfather by adoption). Accord, Jacobs v. Schulmeyer, 117 Ind. App. 275,
70 N.E.2d 435 (1947); Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445
(1898); Pylman v. First Nat'l Bank of Beaumont, 247 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1952)
(denied since legal relation of parent and child is applicable only to
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estate of his first adoptive parents when adopted a second
time; 23 (6) whether or not a child can inherit in a dual capacity
when adopted by a blood relative;24 (7) whether or not he can
inherit from the natural children of the adoptive parents;2 (8)
whether or not an adopted child is an "heir to the body" of his
adoptive parents so as to be allowed to inherit,2 6 and (9) what
consequences to the child's estate if he dies without spouse or is-
sue after the adoption.2 7
Much of the disagreement in the decisions in the above areas
can be attributed to the problem of whether the courts should in-
terpret vague statutes liberally as remedial statutes, or strictly as
statutes in derogation of the common law. It is hoped that the sub-
sequent discussion of three of the above fields will make the dilem-
ma of the courts clearer and possibly give a solution to this seem-
ingly irreconcilable conflict.
Although it is generally thought and stated that an adopted child
22 continued
parent and child, not to collateral relatives). Only if the statute allows
inheritance "through" the natural parents can the child so inherit. In re
Cave's Estate, 326 Pa. 358, 192 Atl. 460 (1937). But cf. Staley v. Honeyman,
98 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio 1950), aff'd, 157 Ohio St. 61, 104 N.E.2d 172 (1952).
23 In re Myres' Estate, 205 Misc. 880, 129 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Surr. Ct. 1954)
(allowed); In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 131 N.E.2d 487 (Ill. 1956) (denied).
24 In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946) (allowed);
Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81, 62 AUt. 253 (1905) (denied).
25 In O'Connell v. Powers, 291 Mass. 153, 197 N.E. 162 (1935), and in In
re Masterson's Estate, 108 Wash. 307, 183 Pac. 93 (1919), under statutes
making the adopted child the legal child of the adoptive parents, the
courts felt that under a liberal interpretation the adopted children could
succeed to the estates of intestate natural children of the adopters. Under
similar statutes a contrary result was reached in Welch v. Funchess, 220
Miss. 691, 71 So. 2d 783 (1954), the court stating that the adopters cannot
make an heir for their kindred; and in Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 59
S.E.2d 836 (1950), based on a strict interpretation of the statute creating a
status unknown at common law. See also, Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller,
39 R.I. 45, 97 Atl. 378 (1916).
26 Scott v. Scott, 247 Fed. 976 (D. Idaho 1917) (allowed); Wheeling
Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946)
(denied).
27 Where the statute established the legal relationship of parent and
child, the adoptive parent succeeded to the intestate child's estate in In re
Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378 (1914); and in Calhoun v.
Bryant, 28 S.D. 266, 133 N.W. 266 (1911); but not in Rumans v.
Lighthizer, 363 Mo. 125, 249 S.W.2d 397 (1952), where it went to the blood
relatives of the child in preferehce to her adoptive mother. See In re Fordor,
202 Misc. 1100, 117 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (Surr. Ct. 1952), where the collateral
relatives of the foster parents were held to be legal kin over the natural
parents and relatives. Contra, National Bank of Lima v. Hancock, 85 Ohio
App. 1, 88 N.E.2d 67 (1948).
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,never loses his right to inherit from his natural parents where
there is no statute to the contrary,28 there are two cases to the
contrary.29 These latter two cases give rise to serious considera-
tion of the theory that a child never ceases to be the child of its
natural parents. Today, with adoption becoming an everyday oc-
currence and children being raised from infancy as the child of the
adopters, it seems that the interest that the child has in his natural
parents' estates should be reconsidered.
The reasoning of the majority rule generally follows the theories
that there is no statute present excluding the right, that adoption
gives additionai rights, and that consanguinity is a bond not easily
broken, especially where the child does not consent; 30 or the rea-
soning merely follows blindly the decisions of early tribunals.31
Further, to reach the result desired, one court invoked the doc-
trine of strict interpretation of the statute; because the statute did
not exclude the child, the child could inherit.32 Another court
reached the same result by a liberal interpretation of a remedial
statute!33
The minority view, on the other hand, looks at the statute -
generally to the effect that all legal rights and duties as between
natural parents and children cease on adoption - with the result
that the statute is interpreted to mean what it says, the right
ceases. Moreover, in making the child a natural child of the adop-
tive parents, Missouri and New Hampshire feel that the child
should not get additional rights by adoption but only the rights
of a natural child, the right to inherit solely from and through his
"parents." This latter view would seem more in line with the mod-
em social results of adoption which effect a complete severence of
the relation between the natural parents and the child upon the
finality of the decree. It must be remembered that the adoption
statutes are for the benefit of the child and society, and generally
28 Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co., 29 Del. Ch. 517, 46 A.2d 881, 888
(Sup. Ct. 1946); In re Tilliski's Estate, 390 IM. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945);
In re Kay's Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391 (1953).
29 Wailes v. Curators of Central College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645
(1953); Young v. Bridges, 86 N.H. 135, 165 Atl. 272 (1933).
30 In re Tilliski's Estate, and In re Kay's Estate, supra note 28; Sorenson
v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927); In re Sauer's Estate, 216
Wis. 289, 257 N.W. 28 (1934).
31 Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Minn. 140, 199 N.W. 581 (1924); In re Kay's
Estate, supra note 28.
32 In re Roderick's Estate, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930).
33 In re Tilliski's Estate, supra note 28. Further confusion in the in-
testate succession field in Illinois is exemplified by the recent case in
In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 131 N.E.2d 487 (Ill. 1956), wherein the Illinois
Supreme Court used a strict interpretation of the statute to prevent a twice
adopted child from inheriting from his first set of adoptive parents.
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the adoptive parents are better able to be good parents than the
natural parents.3 4 Generally the child will get a greater inheri-
tance from the adoptive parents than he would have gotten from
his natural parents. Thus, the argument that the giving up +of the
child by the parents should not deprive him of his inheritance
rights is pure idealism, not in line with everyday realism in this
field. Recognizing this anachronism, fourteen jurisdictions now
expressly prohibit the effect of this fiction by statutory fiat to the
effect that once adopted, the child loses his right to inherit by in-
testacy from his natural parents.35
The second problem is one which was mentioned earlier. It is the
pioblem of whether or not a child loses his right to inherit from a
set of first adoptive parents by a subsequent adoption. By careful
analysis, this problem should receive the same negative decision
as the right to inherit from natural parents. For here, there is not
even the argument of consanguinity. It would be unreasonable to
give a child, the object of a second adoption,, greater inheritance
rights than the inheritance rights of a child who was the object
of only one adoption.
Yet this problem is still with us in the absence of express statu-
tory provisions, and again the courts have had to make the law
with conflicting results. As a primary and self-evident statement,
it is universally agreed that if the right to inherit vests in the
child by reason of the death of the adoptive parent prior to a
second adoption, the second adoption cannot divest the child of
his right to inherit. 36 The conflict arises where the child is
adopted a second time before the death of the first adoptive par-
ent. A dictum in the case of Patterson v. Browning37 summarily
said that dual inheritance was allowable on the analogy of the
right to inherit from the natural parent. The first case on the spe-
34 See excellent discussion in In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147
N.W. 378 (1914).
35 Ant. CODE AN. § 27-207 (Supp. 1952); CA. PROB. CODE ANN. § 257
(Deering Supp. 1955); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6869 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 920 (1953), D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-222 (Supp. 1955); HAWAI REV. LAWS
§ 12278 (1945); Mn. STAT. ANN. § 529.29 (Supp. 1954); Nev. Stat. 46th Sess.
1953, c. 332, § 16; N.J. STAT. Aim. § 9:3-30 (Supp. 1955); N.M. STAT. AtNN.§ 29-1-17 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (Supp. 1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.13 (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon 1950); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63-358 (Supp. 1954).
36 Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993 (1896); Russell's
Adm'r v. Russell's Guardian, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 236 (1892); In re Camp's Estate,
131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736 (1901); accepted in In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 131
N.E.2d 487 (11. 1956); and In re Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P.2d
495 (1941).
37 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993, 994 (1896).
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cific subject was Villier v. Watson,3a which made the Patterson
dictum law (although not citing the latter case) on the basis that
the second adoption merely changed the right of parental control,
not the right of inheritance. No consent to loss of inheritance
was given by the child. This case was followed by Dreyer v.
Schrick,39 which accepted the Patterson reasoning and also based
its decision on the added ground that no statute prohibited dual
inheritance. Cases in Arkansas, 40 Iowa,41 Minnesota, 42 New
York,43 Washington" and Tennessee4 5 followed this reasoning
and allowed the child to inherit. Further, a Louisiana court4 6 re-
cently reached the same result solely on the ground that the right
to inherit vests at adoption.
On the other hand, California, 47 Illinois, 48 Michigan, 49 Okla-
homa5 0 and the dissent in a 5-4 Washington decision5 1 have taken
an opposite view, mainly on the ground that there is a difference
in relation between an adopted child and a natural child, so as to
overcome the Patterson analogy. They felt that two inheritances
are enough-one from natural parents and one from one set of
adoptive parents. The discussion in the Leichtenberg case
52 illus-
trates that public policy dictates this result.53 As seen from the
discussion concerning the right and reason for not inheriting from
38 168 Ky. 631, 182 S.W. 869 (1916). This case according to In re Talley's
Estate, supra note 36, and In re Leichtenberg's Estate, supra note 36, reached
this result solely on the basis of the Russell case, supra note 36. From the
writer's reading of this case, the court reached its result by the reasoning
just mentioned and not the Russell case.
89 105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30 (1919).
40 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951).
41 Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246, 178 N.W. 406 (1920).
42 In re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925).
43 In re Myres' Estate, 205 Misc. 880, 129 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
44 In re Egley's Estate, 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 943 (1943).
45 Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294, 209 S.W.2d 859 (1948).
46 Successien of Gambina, 225 La. 674, 73 So. 2d 800 (1954).
47 In re Zaepfel's Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 774, 228 P.2d 600 (1951); the
court held under the predecessor of CAL. PROD. CODE ANN. § 257 (Deering
Supp. 1955), that where the child could not inherit from the natural
parent neither could he from a prior adopter, and further it disproved the
reasoning of the Sutton case, note 42 supra, and stated that a second adoption
severs all the rights, including inheritance, under the first
48 In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 131 N.E2d 487 (IlM. 1956).
49 In re Carpenter's Estate, 327 Mich. 195, 41 N.W.2d 349 (1950); In re
Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N.W. 381 (1917).
50 In re Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P.2d 495 (1941).
51 In re Egley's Estate, 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 943, 947 (1943).
52 See note 48 supra.
53 In this connection see a fine discussion in In re TaUles Estate,, supra
note 50, 109 P.2d at 498.
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natural parents, the reasoning is doubly strong in this situation.
The last problem, in this series, is whether an adopted child can
inherit a dual share of his adoptive parent's estate when the
adopter is a blood relative. The common occurrence is that upon
the death of the child's parents a grandparent adopts him. Sub-
sequently the grandparent dies intestate, with the typical intest-
ate statute providing that each of the intestate's children take
equally with the descendents of any deceased child taking that
child's share: In this situation the child by the letter of the statute
is entitled to two shares, viz., the share through his deceased par-
ent and a share as a legal child of the decedent. Again, by this
loophole in the statutes, the courts have been presented with the
problem of whether the child should take two shares because of
this oversight by the legislature.
Here also there* are conflicting decisions, One line of authority
holds that the child can take two shares on the theory that, as
seen in many cases in the general area, since the statute does not
prohibit it; the child could take two shares;"s or that adoption
gives "additional rights."56 But the dissent in In re Benner's Es-
tate57 hits the crux of the matter when it states that adoption is
presumed to be more beneficial than the natural relation that did
exist. After this presumption, however, the intent of legal adop-
tion is to give equality with the status of a natural child, not to
give the adopted child more. Therefore, any type of dual inheri-
tance is inconsistent per se. This reasoning, as was the reasoning
disallowing dual inheritance from natural and prior adoptive
parents, seems to be much more in constance with the present
day sociological treatment of adoption as taking the place of,
and be.ing treated fully as, the natural relationship of parent and
child.
The Status of the Law-Statutory Provisions
To date there is no statute which expressly covers all the
problem areas mentioned earlier, but some do cover as many as
54 See-note 47 supra....
55 In-re Wilson's Estate, 95 Colo. 159, 33 P.2d 969. (1934=); In. re. Benner's
Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257. (1946).
56 Wagner v. Varner, 5.0 Iowa. 532 (1879); In re Bartram's Estate,. 109.
Kan. 87,. 198 Pac. 192 (1921)... .
57 166. P.2d 257 at. page 260 (1946). Accord, inheritance only as a
natural child, Delano v. Bruerton, 148 -Mass. 619, 20 N.E. 308, (1889); ancd
Mprgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81, 62 Ati. 253 (1905): A unique Indiana rule allows
only one share - the largest one. Billings v. Head, .184 Ind. 361, 111 N.E. 177
(1916), and its companion case, Head v. Leak, .61. Ind. App. 253,- 111 N.E.
952 (1916). . . .. . :, . -.. . .1
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six points.58 Other states are conspicuous by mentioning none.59
The statutes of fifteen jurisdictions60 allow an adopted child to
inherit from his natural parents, while fourteen 6 ' forbid it. In
eleven 6 2 an adopted child can inherit from other natural relatives,
while in six 6 3 he cannot. In only Idaho, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming are
there no express provisions allowing the adopted child to inherit
from his adoptive parents, while the remaining forty-four juris-
dictions grant the inheritance. 4 Fifteen jurisdictionss allow the
58 Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wis-
consin. See notes 60-77 infra.
59 Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.
See notes 60-77 infra.
60 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 5 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109 (1947); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 731.30 (Supp. 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-121 (Burns 1946);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.530 (Baldwin 1955); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 214.4
(West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 158, § 40 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 §
86(b) (1951); Mass. ANN. LAWs c. 210, § 7 (1955); MicH. STAT. ANN. §
27.3178 (549) (Supp. 1955); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 115; RI. Pub. Laws 1955,
c. 3483; TEx. PRos. CODE § 40 (1956); VT. REv. STAT. § 9954 (1947); Wis.
STAT. § 322.07 (1953).
61 See note 35 supra.
62 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 5 (1940); Anx. STAT. ANN. § 56-109 (1947);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 214.3 (West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 158, § 40
(1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 86 (b) (1951); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 210 § 7
(1955); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (549) (Supp. 1955); R.I. Pub. Laws 1955,
c. 3483; TEx. PROs. CODE § 40 (1956); VT. Rsv. STAT. § 9954 (1947); Wis. STAT.
§ 322.07 (1953).
6-t CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 257 (Deering Supp. 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 6869 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 920 (1953); D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-222
(Supp. 1955); Nev. Stat. 46th Sess. 1953, c. 332, § 16; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
1.8 (Purdon 1950).
64 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 5 (1940); ALAsKA Comip. LAws ANN. § 21-3-21
(1949); ARsz. CODE Am. § 27-207 (Supp. 1952); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109
(1947); CAL. PRoa. CODE ANN. § 257 (Deering Supp. 1955); COLO. REv. STAT.
Am. § 152-2-4 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6869 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 920 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-222 (Supp. 1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
731.30 (Supp. 1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 74.414 (Supp. 1955); HAwAn REv. LAws
§ 12278 (1945); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 3-121 (Burns 1946); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.6 (1950); KAN. GEN.
STAT. AnN. 3§ 59-501, 59-506 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.530 (Baldwin
1955); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 214 (West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 158,
§ 40 (1954); Mn. Am. CODE art. 93, § 142 (1951); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 210,
§ 7 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(549) (Supp. 1955); MPNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 259.29 (Supp. 1954); Miss. Laws Ex. Sess. 1955, c. 34; Mo. ANN. STAT. §
-453.090 (1952); NEy. STAT. 46th Sess. 1953, c. 332, § 16; N.-. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 461:6 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30 (Supp. 1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
29-1-17 (1953); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 115; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1, 48-23
(1950); OHIO REV. CODE § 3107.13 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 52
(1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon 1950); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31,
(Supp. 1955); TEm. CODE Am. § 36-126 (Supp. 1955); Tax. Psos. CODE § 40
§§ 533, 2363 (1955); R.I. Pub. Laws 1955, c. 3483; S.C. CODE § 19-52.11
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child to succeed to the estate of his adoptive kin, while seven do
not.66 Wisconsin allows inheritance from first adoptive parents
while Massachusetts and New Jersey cut the inheritance off by
the second adoption if it is not vested.67 Where there is a ques-
tion of dual capacity, the Indiana6 8 statute follows its case
law and allows the larger share, while Colorado69 allows a choice
of either. Illinois and Pennsylvania 7 ° follow the preferable view
which allows inheritance only in the capacity of an adopted child,
with Louisiana71 merely requiring no dual inheritance. Eight
states72 direct that succession be allowed amongst the natural
children and the adopted child. Missouri73 expressly says that an
adopted child takes as '"an heir of the body," with four other
states74 allowing this result by other language, but seven states75
prohibit an adopted child from taking any property limited to
heirs of the adopter's body. Finally, a great diversity of language
appears when the succession from an intestate child occurs. The
general rule is that the child's estate goes to the adopters or their
kin to the exclusion of the natural parents and relatives7 6 with
64 continued
(1956); VT. RIv. STAT. § 9954 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. 4 63-358 (Supp. 1954);
WAsE. REV. CODE §§ 11.04.020, 26.32.140 (1952); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4759
(1955); Wis. STAT. § 322.07 (1953).
65 Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Virginia and Wisconsin. See note 64 supra.
66 CAL. PROD. CODE ANN. § 257 (Deering Supp. 1955); LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 214,2 (West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. AxN. c. 158, § 40 (1954); MASS. ANN.
LAws c. 210, § 7 (1955); R.I. Pub. Laws 1955, c. 3483; VT. Rv. STAT. § 9954
(1947); W. VA. CODE AwN. § 4759 (1955).
67 W is. STAT. § 322.08 (1953); MAss. Axu. LAWS c. 210, § 7 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-18(f), 9:3-30 (Supp. 1955).
68 IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-209 (Burns 1953).
69 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-2-4 (1953).
70 ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon 1950).
71 LA. Crv. CODE ANr. art. 214.1 (West 1952).
72 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.30 (Supp. 1954); Miss. Laws Ex. Sess. 1955, c. 34;
N.J. STAT. As. § 9:3-30 (Supp. 1955); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 115; S.C. CODE
§ 19-52.11 (Supp. 1955); TsErm. CODE ANN. § 36-126 (Supp. 1955); VT. Rxv.
STAT. § 9954 (1947); W. VA. CODE AwN. § 4759 (1955).
73 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.090 (1952).
74 ARiz. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (Supp. 1952) (full heir); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 731.30 (Supp. 1954) (lineal descendent); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-121 (Burns
1946) (natural heir); WAsH. Ray. CODE § 26.32.140 (1952) (heir).
75 ME. REV. STAT. AwN. c. 158, § 40 (1954); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 461:6
(1955); Omo REv. CODE . 3107.13 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. Aw. tit. 10, § 52(1951); R.I Pub. Laws 1955, c. 3483; VT. REv. STAT. § 9954 (1947); W. VA.
COnE ANN. § 4759 (1955).
76 ALASxA Comp. LAWS A N. § 21-3-21 (1949); CAL. Pson. CODE ANN. "
257 (Deering Supp. 1955); CoNN. GEr. STAT. § 6869 (1949); DEL. CODE Amr.
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some variations.7 Georgia78 provides simply that the adopter
cannot succeed, and Nebraska- 9 merely specifies the natural par-
ents cannot succeed.
A further statutory proviso that is common is to the effect
that if the adopting parent is the spouse of a natural parent (a
step-parent), the provisions in the statute for the extinguishment
of the rights and duties of the natural relationship, including in-
heritance, shall not apply. 0 This saving clause is essential and
advisable. Without it, under the letter of the law, the child could
not inherit the" parent's estate even though the parent was in
fact still the natural parent.
Conclusion
If capable of breakdown to a single point, the problem that the
76 continued
tit. 13, § 920,(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-222 (Supp. 1955); FLA.-STAT. ANN.
§ 731.30 (Supp. 1954) (parents only); HA,AII REv. LAws § 12278 (1945)
(parents only); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955) (see,
however, infra note 77); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 600.6, 636.32, 636.42 (1950)
(see, however, infra note 77); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-507 (1949); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.530 (Baldwin 1955); LA. Civ. CODE AWN. art. 214, 2142,
214.5 (West 1952)-(parents only); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 158, § 40 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 93 § 142 (1951); MIcH STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (156) (Supp.
1955) (see, however, infra note 77); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (Supp. 1954);
Miss. Laws Ex. Sess. 1955. c. 34; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.090 (1952); NEB.
Rzv. STAT. §.43.111 (1952); Nev. Stat. 46th Sess. 1953, c. 332, § 16; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30 (Supp. 1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-17 (1953); N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAw § 115; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1, 48-23 (1950); Oro REv. CODE
§ 3107.13 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit; .10, § 53 (1951) (but only property
taken by adopted child through adopting parents); ORE. REV. STAT." § 109.041
(1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon 1950); P.R. LAws ANn. tit. 31,
§§ 533, 2363 (1955);. S.C. CODE § 19-52.11 (Supp: 1955); TENN. "CODE ANN.
§ 36-126 (Supp. 1955) (but only property acquired after adoption);- TEx.
PROB. CODE § 40 (1956); VT. REv. STAT. § 9954 (1947)-; VA. CODE ANN. § 63-358
(Supp. 1954); WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.32.140 (1952); W. VA.- CODE ANN. § 4759
(1955). -
77 Provisions to the effect that property acquired from natural parents
and relatives go back to them as if there were no adoption are found in:
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 3, § 165 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955); ME. REv. "STAT. ANN.
c. 158, § 40 (1954); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 210, § 7 (1955); Wis. STAT. § 322.07
(1953). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109 (1947), MCH. "STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(156)
(Supp. 1955) (for realty) and N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 461:6 (1955), merely"
provide that such property returns to the natural, parents. The hdiana aifd
Iowa statutes send the property back to the natural. parents and their
heirs if the child has no heirs. IND. Aim. STAT. § 3-121 (Burns 1946); IowA"
CODE ANN. § 636.43 (1950).
78 GA. CODE ANN. § 74.414 (Supp. 1955). -"
.79. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43.111 (1952). ""
80 See, as typical, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-222 (Supp. 1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-30 (Supp. 1955); OnIo REv. CODE § 3107.13 (Page- 1954);'PA: STAT.
AwN. tit. 20, § 1.8 (Purdon 1950). .
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courts are constantly straining to decide is whether the case be-
fore them should be treated in a liberal fashion, on the theory that
the incomplete statute in force is a remedial enactment; or, on the
other hand, should the problem be handled strictly with rules of
construction such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius? Should
the statute be read literally, or should a strict construction be
required of statutes in derogation of the common law, thus ig-
noring the demands of modern day society? If the courts ap-
proach the problem on a case-to-case basis, looking at the result.
best for the child and society, they may be inconsistent in their
reasoning.81 That this irritant of the courts is present cannot be
denied. There is a constant surge of cases. That this may become
a tidal wave is foreseeable, with the increasing number of adop-
tions and the constant demand that has outweighed the supply, as
has been proven by the rise of "black-market" babies. To cure
this evil, the present litigation and the possible increase, as well
as a great depletion of estates, the writer strongly feels the only
solution is complete and comprehensive legislation that encom-
passes the I1egal problems and ideas of today.
Solution
As seen from the foregoing discussion the ideal statute would
expressly cut off all the rights of the child to inherit from his
natural parents and relatives under intestacy laws. This recom-
mendation is based on three practical reasons: first, there is
generally a complete severance from the natural parents, and the
child benefits by this severance;8 2 second, the child benefits by
acquiring more suitable parents and their name and way of life;
and, third, the law desires him to have the same, not more, than
natural children. Dual inheritance would negate this purpose of
the law.
Next, the statute should provide that the child be made a full
child of the adoptive parents with the right to inherit from and
through them, along with the parents' natural and other adopted
children and their kin. Also, the child should be given the right
to inherit as a "heir of the body."
Further, if the child dies, the laws of intestacy should apply,
and the intestate should be treated as a natural child of the adop-
tive family and their kin for all purposes with no exceptions.
81 Contrast the liberal approach by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re
Tilliski's Estate, 390 M11. 273, 61 N.E2d 24 (1945), and the strict approach
in In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 131 N.E.2d 487 (IlM. 1956).
S2 See discussion of this point in Wailes v. Curators of Central College,
362 Mo, 932,. 25. S.W.d 645 .(19R);,Youg y..Brjdges, .86 N., .135, 165 Atl.
272 (1933); aid bIy the dfsse;hting" j.u"cq in in reBeimers Estate, 109 Utah-
112; 166 P.2d 257, 260 (1946).: . "
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Also, if the child were adopted by a blood relative, then the
child should be considered only as "a child" and not as any other
type of relative. These provisions should further be supplemented
by a provision that adoption cuts off rights of inheritance from
prior adoptive parents and their kin, unless vested before the
latter adoption, just the same as in the case of natural parents.
A saving proviso, that the child loses no rights when adopted
by a spouse of a natural parent, is also a necessary point as seen
earlier.8 3
A statute containing these elements would be a great advance
in this field of law and would make it modern and workable in
application to people's daily lives. It must be reiterated that
the absence of these elements is a shortcoming that the courts
should not reasonably have to bear, for inheritance is a creature
of the legislatures. They are duty-bound to make clear and
complete any rights and mandates they give-not in general,
vague and inadequate terms as they have done to date.
James M. Corcoran, Jr.
83 In support of these conclusions see similar recommendations thirteen
years ago: Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child,
28 WASH. U.Q. 221 (1943).
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